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The nations of the world face the intersection of two global 
dilemmas: enhancing economic welfare and mitigating climate 
change. With a “point of no return” for the latter of these 
predicaments rapidly approaching and unilateral action on either of 
these problems proving minimally, if at all, effectual, the world faces 
a pervasive and imminent threat. However, recent international 
jurisprudence and global sentiment provides a single solution for each 
of these quandaries in the form of a carbon tax regime. Previous 
scholarship focused on structural deficiencies within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that prevent certainty and encourage inaction or 
organizational modification. However, few have considered the 
possibilities present within the current regime, and how using these 
existing structures may enable the efficacy of unilateral action vis-à-
vis each of these dilemmas. 
A carbon tax regime consisting of both domestic carbon taxes and 
border adjustments for those who fail to comply with the international 
efforts potentially meets the strictures under both the Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“Kyoto Protocol”) and the WTO and creates a more efficient market. 
Few, if any, solutions match the efficacy of a carbon tax regime in 
compliance with the regulatory parameters currently permitted by a 
small mass of nations that serve to effect substantial climate change 
mitigation that conforms with international trade laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
ational governments worldwide are joining in the pursuit of two 
concurrent international objectives: enhancing economic welfare 
by liberalizing world trade and mitigating climate change by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.1 The two distinct multilateral efforts—
 
1 See generally Timothy O. Randhir & Thomas W. Hertel, Trade Liberalization as a 
Vehicle for Adapting to Global Warming, 29 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 159 
(2000); see also Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm (last visited 
July 22, 2013) (concluding “Integration into the world economy has proven a powerful 
means for countries to promote economic growth, development, and poverty reduction”); 
Climate, Environment, and the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external 
N
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administered by the WTO2 and the Kyoto Protocol3—operate 
simultaneously and autonomously to achieve their respective goals. 
At the intersection of the two efforts, however, lies the potential for 
conflict.4 
International trade is the exchange of capital, goods, and services 
across international borders or territories.5 Throughout history, there 
have been numerous models for international trade; however, all 
models share the basic characteristic that the pattern of a nation’s 
production can differ from the pattern of its consumption.6 This 
allows any country to experience greater access to resources not 
endemic to its particular area, as well as a pecuniary benefit from 
entering the world market.7 
When a country voluntarily complies with a domestic or 
international emissions abatement program, a global benefit is 
reached at a cost to the participating country.8 However, an agreement 
that does not include the participation of all global actors always 
leaves open the possibility for “carbon leakage.”9 For example, one 
 
/np/exr/facts/enviro.htm (last visited July 24, 2013) (affirming that “[designing a response] 
to climate change has become one of the world’s foremost policy challenges”). 
2 The World Trade Organization is “an organization for liberalizing trade.” What is the 
World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e 
/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). “The [WTO] deals with the global 
rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, 
predictably and freely as possible.” Id. 
3 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits its Parties by setting 
internationally binding emission reduction targets. Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items 
/2830.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Kyoto Generally]. 
4 TIMOTHY E. DEAL, U.S. COUNCIL FOR INT’L BUS., WTO RULES AND PROCEDURES 
AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf. 
5 E.g., International Trade, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www 
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/291349/international-trade (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). 
6 Ronald W. Jones & Sugata Marjit, International Trade Models and Real World 
Features, EUROPEAN TRADE STUDY GRP., 2009, at 1, available at http://www.etsg.org 
/ETSG2007/papers/jones.pdf. 
7 Id. 
8 Claudia Kemfert, International Games of Climate Change Policies: The Economic 
Effectiveness of Partial Coalition Games, PURDUE UNIV. GLOBAL TRADE ANALYSIS 
PROJECT 3–4 (2001), available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources 
/download/243.pdf. 
9 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CLIMATE POLICY AND CARBON LEAKAGE: IMPACTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME ON ALUMINIUM 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Aluminium_EU_ETS.pdf. 
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country or region may implement an incentive structure that reduces 
internal carbon emissions only to have the emissions relocate to a 
country without such regulations.10 This fear is not lost on the WTO 
member nations that are both attempting to procure the benefits of 
international trade and voluntarily abating emissions. There is a 
widespread belief that pervasive international resentment over such 
free riding could lead to the implementation of policies that penalize a 
country for competitive advantages resulting from its non-adherence 
to collective actions aimed at mitigating anthropogenic impacts on the 
environment.11 
The United States’ failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol inarguably 
contributed to the “clash over climate change commitments” 
concerning the agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.12 This free rider problem is endemic to political processes 
and has substantial implications for voluntary commitments to public 
good.13 The differing measures and commitments, or lack thereof, 
among the world’s nations for mitigating climate change and reducing 
emissions present significant ground for international conflict. While 
many nations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and adopted regimes to 
combat global climate change in accordance with their legally binding 
commitments, others have not, creating for themselves an inherent 
competitive advantage.14 In response, WTO member nations seeking 
to “rebalance the economic burden of shifting to a low-carbon 
 
10 Id. 
11 A “free rider” refers to someone who benefits from resources, goods, benefits, or 
services without paying for the cost of the benefit. James A. Sheppard, Productivity Loss 
in Performance Groups: A Motivation Analysis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 67, 69 (1993). See 
DEAL, supra note 4, at 2 (“The possibility of a clash over climate change commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol and WTO rules arises because of the U.S. decision to abandon 
Kyoto. Strong resentment over this action, particularly in Europe, could lead the EU, and 
perhaps others, to undertake actions to penalize American and other non-Annex 1 firms for 
alleged competitive advantages resulting from their non-adherence to Kyoto, although the 
probability of such action is low at the present time.”); see also John Hontelez, Time to 
Tax the Carbon Dodgers, BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2007, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/6524331.stm (“These countries [which haven’t ratified the Kyoto Protocol and don’t 
impose a ‘carbon charge’ on their exports] unfairly favour their own goods and 
discriminate against nations that do apply such a charge, as the European Union is doing 
with its Emissions Trading Scheme, and some of its members with carbon taxes.”). 
12 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2. 
13 Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free 
Riding: New Evidence of Probability Bias and Learning, 1 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working 
Paper No. 549, 1990), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/64219 
/testinggametheor00palf.pdf?sequence=1. 
14 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2. 
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society” have looked to international trade law to even the playing 
field.15 
Anthropogenic climate change is a widely recognized global 
problem.16 According to the International Energy Agency, trends 
indicate that “delaying action is a false economy”17 and cost of taking 
measures to combat climate change now is much less expensive than 
waiting until 2020 or 2030.18 Both from an economic and a 
sociological perspective, experts agree that the time for action on this 
issue is now. The impetuses behind this Article are to consider and 
embrace the validity of a carbon tax regime vis-à-vis international 
trade law, and to solve the collective action problem that underlies 
action in response to global climate change. 
This Article first will discuss why carbon taxation, as part of a tax 
regime composed of both carbon taxes and border adjustments, is a 
viable solution for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and mitigating 
climate change. It will then explore the necessity for border 
adjustments as a supplement to carbon taxation as a means to 
conserve an exhaustible natural resource. Border adjustments 
additionally reduce the loss of competitiveness suffered by domestic 
industries and producers in relation to their international competitors 
not subject to similar tax obligations. Moreover, this Article discusses 
the implications of such proposed measures on the Kyoto Protocol 
and the WTO, thoroughly analyzing the relevant provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as the considerable 
uncertainty that surrounds the topic due to the lack of jurisprudence 
on border adjustments. Finally, in a world ever-nearing the precarious 
“point of no return” amid discussion of topics where “certainty is 
impossible,” this Article addresses the viability of a solution that 
 
15 See, e.g., Hontelez, supra note 11. 
16 Global Warming Seen as a Major Problem Around the World Less Concern in the 
U.S., China and Russia, PEW RES. (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/02 
/global-warming-seen-as-a-major-problem-around-the-world-less-concern-in-the-us-china 
-and-russia/; see also Kristin Eberhard, New Poll: Americans Believe Global Warming is 
Real and Threatens Their Families, SWITCHBOARD NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL 
STAFF BLOG (Oct. 24, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/new_poll 
_americans_believe_glo.html. 
17 Brad Plumer, When Do We Hit the Point of No Return for Climate Change?, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 10, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post 
/when-do-we-hit-the-point-of-no-return-for-climate-change/2011/11/10/gIQA4rri8M_blog 
.html. 
18 Id.; NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 
(2006). 
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comports with the strictures of both international trade law and 
climate commitments and implores its implementation.19 
I 
HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE 
GLOBAL TRADE REGIME WITH CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
POLICY 
A. The Kyoto Protocol 
In December 1997, 160 developed and developing countries 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement that set 
binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.20 Parties 
originally committed to reduce emissions to an average of five 
percent below 1990 levels.21 Although the first commitment period 
ended in 2012, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change reconvened in December 2012 to adopt the “Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol,” which creates a new commitment 
period for the current 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.22 During the 
second commitment period, from 2013 to 2020, Parties have 
committed to reduce emissions by at least eighteen percent below 
1990 levels.23 
The Kyoto Protocol offers Parties considerable flexibility in 
meeting their prescribed emissions commitments.24 Countries with 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to limit or reduce emissions 
must meet their targets primarily through national measures.25 As an 
additional means of meeting these targets, the Kyoto Protocol 
 
19 AARON COSBEY & RICHARD TARASOFSKY, CHATHAM HOUSE, CLIMATE CHANGE, 
COMPETITIVENESS AND TRADE 20 (2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007 
/climate_trade_competitive.pdf. 
20 See Kyoto Generally, supra note 3. 
21 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at art. 3, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php (last visited July 20, 
2013) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
22 John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield Commitment to Ambitious, but Unclear, 
Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/science/eart 
h/talks-on-climate-produce-promises-and-complaints.html; Status of Ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited July 20, 
2013). 
23 Kyoto Generally, supra note 3. 
24 DEAL, supra note 4, at 2. 
25 Kyoto Generally, supra note 3. 
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introduced three market-based mechanisms, thereby creating what is 
known as “the carbon market.”26 Consequently, Parties may consider 
the implementation of carbon taxes, excise taxes based on carbon 
content, and emissions as central components to broader national 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions.27 According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Parties should strive for a “progressive reduction or phasing 
out of market imperfections . . . in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors 
that run counter to the [Protocol’s] objective.”28 
B. World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization is an international organization that 
governs the global rules of trade among nations.29 Its goal is to help 
producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers to conduct 
their business “while allowing governments to meet social and 
environmental objectives.”30 The WTO agreements, negotiated and 
signed by the Organization’s 153 members, function as contracts 
whose purpose is to provide “legal ground rules for international 
commerce . . . binding governments to keep their trade policies within 
agreed limits.”31 The WTO’s main objective is to maintain the free 
and open flow of trade, and its General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) provide the “underpinnings to the global trading 
system.”32 The fundamental principles of the WTO system are the 
“most favored nation” principle,33 the “national treatment” 
 
26 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FACT SHEET: 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 1 (2011), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders 
/application/pdf/fact_sheet_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf; Kyoto Generally, supra note 3. 
27 Lucas Assunção & ZhongXiang Zhang, Domestic Climate Change Policies and the 
WTO 2 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No. 164, 2002), 
available at http://unctad.org/EN/DOCS/OSGDP164_EN.pdf. 
28 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 2. 
29 The WTO in Brief, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e 
/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
30 WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep10_chap1_e.pdf. 
31 Id. at 2, 6. 
32 Lawrence L. Herman, Energy Trade, Carbon Emissions and the WTO, 2 J. WORLD 
ENERGY L. & BUS. 196, 196–97 (2009) (“Without [GATT], the ordered processes of 
international commerce, including trade in energy goods and services, would be at risk.”). 
33 Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions 
Between Free Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
45, 60 (2006). This is the nondiscrimination between like products from different nations. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
at art. I [hereinafter GATT]. 
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principle,34 and the elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade.35 
“Without [these] rules, the ordered processes of international 
commerce, including trade in energy goods and services, would be at 
risk.”36 
C. Relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization 
The international community shares joint interests in enhancing 
economic wellbeing through promoting world trade and mitigating 
global climate change via the reduction of greenhouse gases. To 
further those joint interests, the international community has 
supported two distinct multilateral efforts: the Kyoto Protocol and the 
WTO. However, the implementation of various proposals to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol may 
impede international trade, thereby potentially violating the WTO’s 
rules governing world trade.37 
Article II of the Kyoto Protocol urges Parties to implement their 
policies and measures “in such a way as to minimize adverse effects   
. . . on international trade.”38 The relationship between the Kyoto 
Protocol and the WTO becomes “increasingly pertinent as proposals 
percolate to the surface” that implement border adjustments in 
conjunction with other market mechanisms designed to mitigate 
climate change.39 Part II addresses and resolves the potential 
regulatory conflicts between a carbon tax regime under the Kyoto 
Protocol and the rules of international trade provided by the WTO 
under GATT. 
 
34 The “national treatment” principle is “nondiscrimination between imported products 
and like domestic products.” Carlarne, supra note 33, at 60. 
35 Id. 
36 Herman, supra note 32, at 196. 
37 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars illustrates an example of how 
WTO/GATT trade provisos may create a conflict between trade rules and environmental 
measures: a semiconductor produced with ozone-depleting substances would be banned in 
accordance with the Montreal Protocol. However, the “like” product provision of GATT 
Article III likely would invalidate the trade discrimination based on the use of ozone-
depleting substances. WILLIAM KRIST, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
THE WTO AND MEAS: TIME FOR A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY (2002), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-wto-and-meas-time-for-good-neighbor           
-policy. 
38 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 2. 
39 Herman, supra note 32, at 196. 
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II 
MEETING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S OBJECTIVE OF REMEDYING 
“MARKET IMPERFECTIONS” THROUGH A CARBON TAX REGIME 
A. Carbon Taxation 
“Economists of nearly all methodological and ideological stripes 
concur that the best way . . . to stave off the worst impacts of climate 
change is through some form of taxation on the carbon content of 
fossil fuels.”40 Generally, market prices for carbon-based fuels and 
products or services that require the use of such fuels do not reflect 
the full social and environmental costs of their production and 
consumption.41 In economics, the term “externality” represents the 
additional cost or benefit that results from an activity or transaction 
and that affects an otherwise uninvolved party who did not choose to 
incur that cost or benefit.42 Because externalities are oftentimes 
pushed from the transaction onto the public at large, they form an 
inefficient market.43 Carbon taxes curb emissions by incorporating 
the negative externalities of fossil fuels and increasing the price of 
fuels with higher carbon contents, thereby internalizing the costs of 
the former externality and reducing demand for carbon-based fuels.44 
Putting a price on carbon provides the appropriate market 
incentives to reduce carbon emissions.45 A tax structure based on 
carbon content would increase the cost of producing energy from 
fossil fuels, which would encourage market participants to reduce 
 
40 Barry Rabe, The Political Viability of Carbon Taxation, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 5, 
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/12/05-carbon-tax  
-rabe. 
41 Steve Waygood, How Do the Capital Markets Undermine Sustainable Development? 
What Can Be Done to Correct This?, 1 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INVESTMENT 81, 83 
(2011), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3763/jsfi.2010.0008. 
42 See James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371 
(1962). 
43 Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm (last updated Mar. 
28, 2012). 
44 See Carbon Taxes, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., http://www.aph.gov.au/About 
_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_by_Topic 
/ClimateChange/responses/economic/carbontax (last updated Nov. 19, 2010); Bjorn 
Lomborg, Carbon Tax a Costly Feel-Good Gesture that Won’t Reduce Emissions, 
AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 17 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs 
/opinion/carbon-tax-a-costly-feel-good-gesture-that-wont-reduce-emissions/story-e6frgd 
0x-1226197203654. 
45 KENNETH P. GREEN ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE: CAPS VS. TAXES 5 (2d ed. 2007). 
VINCENT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2013  11:58 AM 
172 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 163 
their consumption of such energy and create the appropriate 
incentives for more efficient energy use.46 The tax would create 
further incentives to reduce the use of carbon-intensive energy by 
flowing through the cost to consumer products; as a result, consumers 
would economize in consumption and manufacturers would become 
more efficient in order to increase profits.47 
Carbon taxes provide price stabilization while allowing for 
adjustability, market certainty, and predictability.48 Because most 
carbon taxes are included in the overall price of energy, the portion of 
energy cost per unit that stems from fluctuations in market rates for 
fossil fuels would shrink as a percentage of the whole.49 That 
shrinkage makes the price of a given form of energy less volatile in 
calculating production costs, while increasing investor and consumer 
confidence.50 Moreover, a carbon tax regime would have the 
flexibility to strain or relax the carbon levy subject to current market 
conditions.51 By these mechanisms, carbon taxes would enable 
countries to regularly monitor and assess energy consumption and 
make appropriate adjustments to maintain predictability and certainty 
within the market. 
The structure of a carbon tax regime makes it the superior choice 
among alternatives allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon taxes 
function as an excise tax based on the carbon content of fuel and 
would be imposed on market participants for each ton of carbon 
dioxide emitted into the atmosphere.52 Many economists view a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax regime as a superior policy alternative for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions because “a carbon tax equal to the 
damage per ton of CO2 will lead to exactly the right balance between 
 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 Id. at 5–6. 
48 Id. at 6; Vs. Cap-Trade, CARBON TAX CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/issues/carbon 
-taxes-vs-cap-and-trade (last updated Mar. 22, 2011). 
49 GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. 
50 Id.; Shelly K. Schwartz, Oil-Price Volatility Bedevils Business and Consumers, 
CNBC.COM (June 11, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43138643; Mark Kukis, 
Consumer Confidence: A Key Recession Signal, TIME (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.time 
.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1847792,00.html. 
51 If the tax was too stringent, it could easily be relaxed over a period to allow markets 
to react with certainty. Likewise, if the tax was too relaxed to actually produce results, it 
could similarly be increased to incentivize greater reduction of carbon emissions. GREEN 
ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. 
52 See Brad Plumer, How Would a Carbon Tax Work? Let’s Ask British Columbia., 
WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/19/how-would-a-carbon-tax-work-lets-ask-british-columbia/. 
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the cost of reducing emissions and the resulting benefits of less global 
warming.”53 Research also shows that the efficacy of such a carbon-
pricing mechanism produces net gains five times higher than even the 
best designed quantity-control regime, such as a cap-and-trade 
system.54 Moreover, revenue collected from carbon taxes would 
remain within the sovereign’s control, so nations could maintain 
independence and retain revenues within the individual sovereign 
state.55 Such a policy would remove a country’s incentives for 
cheating or insincere participation in carbon-reduction programs.56 
Countries could use their preexisting tax collection mechanisms and 
institutions, with extensive experience in enforcing compliance, to 
make it difficult for market participants to manipulate the system or 
avoid carbon taxes.57 
Furthermore, carbon taxation lends itself to the concept of a 
double-dividend, where the tax is paired with a reduction of other 
taxes in a way that improves the overall efficiency of the 
implementing nation’s economy.58 The first dividend is the actual 
reduction of the adverse environmental externality.59 The second 
dividend is the improvement in economic efficiency from the use of 
environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes, such as income 
taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions.60 In this respect, 
carbon taxes “can produce a far more equitable result than cap-and-
trade” systems through either the double dividend concept or 
“progressive tax-shifting to reduce regressive payroll or sales 
taxes.”61 As the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research asserts, “[c]riticisms notwithstanding, logic suggests that the 
pursuit of a strong double dividend is desirable as a matter of public 
policy. . . . [I]f aggressive actions are to be taken to control GHG 
 
53 WILLIAM PIZER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, CHOOSING PRICE OR QUANTITY CONTROLS 
FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 6–7 (1999), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF 
-CCIB-17.pdf; see also GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 4. 
54 See GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 4; PIZER, supra note 53, at 6. 
55 GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. 





61 Vs. Cap-Trade, supra note 48. 
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emissions, carbon-centered tax reform . . . is the superior policy 
option.”62 
Several countries have successfully adopted carbon taxes as a 
central component of their efforts to reduce emissions.63 Carbon-
pricing schemes are expected to have jurisdiction in at least thirty-
three countries and eighteen sub-national jurisdictions by the end of 
2013.64 Denmark used revenue generated from its carbon taxes to 
concurrently finance energy efficiency investments that reduced its 
emissions by four percent between 1992 and 2000.65 In 1990, Finland 
implemented a carbon tax and reduced its emissions seven percent by 
1998.66 Similarly, Sweden reduced its carbon emissions by roughly 
twenty percent between 1991 and 2000.67 The success of carbon tax 
programs abroad only increases the practicability of implementing 
such regimes elsewhere as the most efficient means of complying 
with their emission commitments. 
While carbon taxes offer an effective means of complying with the 
Kyoto Protocol, they also have significant implications for 
international trade.68 In the absence of an internationally uniform tax, 
the imposition of a carbon tax in any particular country or region will 
lead to less economically competitive domestic industries when 
compared to foreign competitors not subject to taxation.69 For 
instance, domestic producers would bear the burden of increased 
energy taxes that would increase their production costs, while foreign 
producers would incur no additional costs. The consequences of such 
 
62 GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 10–11. 
63 TIM FLANNERY ET AL., CLIMATE COMM’N, THE CRITICAL DECADE: 
INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 32–45 (2012), available at http://climate 
commission.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/climatecommission_internationalReport_20120 
821.pdf. 
64 Id. at 35. 
65 DUNCAN BRACK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 
64 (2000). 
66 LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B: RESCUING A PLANET UNDER STRESS AND A 
CIVILIZATION IN TROUBLE 243 (2003), available at http://www.earth-policy.org/images 
/uploads/book_files/EPRPart3.pdf. 
67 BENGT JOHANSSON, SWED. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN 
PRACTICE 1: CARBON TAX IN SWEDEN 8 (1997), available at http://www.oecd.org 
/science/inno/2108273.pdf. 
68 See, e.g., Jean Chemnick, Economists Slice, Dice Carbon Tax at Forum, E&E 
PUBL’G (Feb. 28, 2013), http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2013/02/28/4. 
69 See generally Stacey Schultz, British Columbia Rethinks its Pioneering Carbon Tax, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 3, 2012), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy 
/2012/05/120503-british-columbia-reviews-carbon-tax/. 
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asymmetry would be especially severe for energy-intensive sectors.70 
In those sectors, energy prices comprise a significant share of total 
production costs, making them particularly vulnerable to the 
competitive disadvantage of a carbon tax and thus likely to resist the 
implementation of such taxes.71 Accordingly, in the 1990s, carbon tax 
proposals in the United States, the European Union, and Australia 
failed largely because of opposition from the energy-intensive sectors 
and other business interests that feared losing their international 
competitiveness. Because of such opposition, no national government 
would be able to implement a carbon tax without offering concurrent 
measures to lessen the burden on the energy-intensive sectors.72 
The presence of international trade also threatens the 
environmental objectives of the tax. In the absence of countervailing 
measures, reductions in domestic carbon emissions may simply be 
offset by carbon leakage.73 Thus, national governments must design 
carbon tax policies that address both the economic and the 
environmental consequences of international trade. Because such 
measures may disrupt trade flows, these offsetting policies constitute 
the central point of tension between the goals of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the rules of the WTO. 
To counterbalance the economic burden of a carbon tax, national 
governments have three primary options. Governments may resolve 
to neutralize the burden by exempting the energy-intensive sectors; 
however, such actions diminish the efficacy of the tax by limiting the 
incentive among the market participants that pollute the most.74 
 
70 “Anyone writing a carbon tax would have to make many design decisions, including 
how and whether to protect trade-exposed, energy-intensive industries from being placed 
at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign competitors.” See Chemnick, supra note 
68. 
71 JAMES BARRETT, CIVIL SOC’Y INST., EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
10–11, available at http://www.civilsocietyinstitute.org/reports/GEGWS-BarrettChapter 
.pdf. 
72 J. Andrew Hoerner & Frank Muller, Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a 
Competitive World 12–14 (Swiss Fed. Office for Foreign Econ, Affairs, 1996), available 
at rprogress.org/publications/1996/swiss_1996.pdf. 
73 Carbon leakage occurs when there is an increase in carbon dioxide emissions in one 
country as a result of an emissions reduction by a second country with a strict climate 
policy. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 9, at 10. 
74 David Rich, Climate Change, Carbon Taxes, and International Trade: An Analysis of 
the Emerging Conflict between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, at 5 (Dec. 9, 2004) 
(unpublished paper for Environmental Economics and Policy 131, University of California 
at Berkley), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP131/fall2006/NotableStudent 
04/ClimateChangeRich.pdf. 
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Alternatively, governments may use the tax revenue acquired to lower 
other taxes or to provide refunds to corporations in order to ease the 
burden on adversely affected sectors.75 While revenue recycling is 
preferable to exemptions because it maintains the incentive to reduce 
emissions, it may be inefficient and firms may still incur a loss of 
competitiveness under such a plan. Therefore, the most effective way 
to maintain international competitiveness without compromising the 
efficacy of the tax is to adjust the taxes of energy-intensive goods at 
the border.76 A border adjustment consists of imposing carbon taxes 
on imports at the domestic rate in order to maintain competitiveness 
domestically while relieving exports of taxation, allowing them to 
compete untaxed in international markets.77 “By removing the 
asymmetry between foreign and domestic producers, [border 
adjustments] offer a solution to the loss of competitiveness arising 
from carbon taxes.”78 However, because these taxes serve as possible 
barriers to trade, they also present a potential conflict with WTO 
rules.79 
B. Border Adjustments 
Border adjustments have the potential to serve as a remedy for 
conflicting tax regimes between trading nations. In recognition of the 
potential for border adjustments to harmonize differing tax regimes as 
well as their anticipated conflicts with WTO law, the international 
economic community formed the Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments (“Working Party”) in 1968.80 The Working Party was 
charged with examining the GATT provisions relevant to border 
adjustments, the practices of contracting parties to border 
adjustments, and the possible effects of such adjustments on 
international trade, before reporting its findings and recommendations 
 
75 See id. at 6; William G. Gale et al., Carbon Taxes as Part of the Fiscal Solution, 
BROOKINGS INST., at III.C. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers 
/2013/03/12-carbon-tax-gale. 
76 Rich, supra note 74, at 6. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny of their trade policies and 
practices to ensure they do not impose an unfair barrier to trade. See Understanding the 
WTO, supra note 30. 
80 WORLD TRADE ORG., REPORT BY THE WORKING PARTY ON BORDER TAX 
ADJUSTMENTS ¶ 4 (1970) [hereinafter GATT Working Party], available at http://www 
.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF /90840088.pdf. 
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to the WTO General Council.81 In its examination, the Working Party 
adopted the definition of “border adjustment” created by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the 
destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be 
relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in 
respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the home 
market and which enable imported products sold to consumers to be 
charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country 
in respect of similar domestic products).82 
While the Working Party found border adjustments applied to 
imports that are “like” the domestic, locally taxed products 
permissible,83 it offered little guidance as to whether imported 
products produced from carbon-emitting Processes and Production 
Methods (PPMs)84 were eligible for border adjustments.85 
Border adjustments could serve as “a justifiable threat to 
irresponsible governments . . . , which refuse to implement Kyoto.”86 
Ideally, they would apply to both imports and exports entering into 
international trade, enabling nations to offset the economic burdens 
associated with carbon taxes when trading countries vary in their tax 
regimes.87 Nations could tax imports from non-carbon-taxing 
countries based on their carbon content.88 This would enable 
 
81 Id. ¶ 1. 
82 Id. ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 Id. 
84 A process and production method is the way in which a product is made. Many 
products go through a number of stages, and therefore a number of PPMs, before 
they are ready for market. For example, making paper requires trees to be grown 
and harvested, the wood to be processed, the pulp often to be bleached, and so 
on. The various processes will have different sorts of environmental impacts—on 
biodiversity, on forest-based streams and wildlife, on human health from 
chemical pollution of waterways, or in terms of air pollution and energy use. 
Other paper may be made from post-consumer waste, a different process 
involving a different set of environmental impacts. 
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A HANDBOOK 53 (2d 
ed. 2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/trade/handbook/5_1.htm. 
85 Herman, supra note 32, at 206; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental 
“PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 59–60 
(2002). 
86 Hontelez, supra note 11. 
87 GATT Working Party, supra note 80, ¶ 5. 
88 Daniel McNamee, Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the World Trade 
Organization: Challenges and Conflicts, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 41, 41–42 
(2006). 
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countries to “rectify domestic price differentials by taxing imported 
products at the same level as those produced domestically.”89 For 
exports, nations could offer rebates for carbon taxes paid by taxed 
producers for goods exported to other countries with carbon taxes.90 
Countries would be able to refund the carbon taxes paid by their 
domestic producers for exported goods in order to prevent the double 
taxation of domestic producers by both the domestic state as well as 
the importing state.91 
Although carbon taxes coupled with border adjustments present a 
viable solution for reducing emissions, the unilateral adoption of such 
a regime “may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO 
consistency and the conditions under which border taxes can be 
adjusted to accommodate a loss of international competitiveness.”92 
These questions arise because such a tax regime may be considered a 
barrier to trade, and therefore present a potential conflict with the 
rules of the WTO.93 
III 
THE GATT-LEGALITY OF BORDER ADJUSTMENTS 
A. The Uncertainty and Lack of WTO Jurisprudence Surrounding 
Border Adjustments 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the interpretation of WTO 
trade rules as they apply to border adjustments. While border 
adjustments on direct taxes94 are categorically impermissible under 
GATT, they may be permitted in some circumstances for certain types 
 
89 Id. at 42. 
90 Joshua Elliott et al., Trade and Carbon Taxes, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (2010), 
available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~kortum/papers/AERpp_final.pdf. 
91 Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax Cooperation on Climate 
Change 13–15, U.N. Doc. E/c.18/2010/CRP.12 (2010), available at http://www.un.org/esa 
/ffd/tax/sixthsession/CRP12_Draft.pdf. 
92 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting Assunção & XiangZhang supra note 27, at 3) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
93 All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny of their trade policies and 
practices to ensure they do not impose an unfair barrier to trade. See UNDERSTANDING THE 
WTO, supra note 30. 
94 “Direct taxes are primarily taxes on natural persons (e.g., individuals), and they are 
typically based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay as measured by income, consumption, or 
net wealth.” Taxation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com 
/EBchecked/topic/584578/taxation (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). 
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of indirect taxes.95 At the time of the drafting of GATT in the mid-
1940s, little consideration was paid to the interaction of GATT with 
market-based measures aimed at mitigating climate change and 
environmental damage.96 In fact, the rules on border adjustments 
were “developed primarily with the goals of competitiveness and 
absence of protectionism in mind.”97 Further, “[t]hey were not 
developed with environmental taxes in mind.”98 Consequently, 
environmentally driven market-based measures like carbon tax border 
adjustments do not easily fit into the rules and exceptions established 
by international trade law, and a tremendous lack of clarity surrounds 
the interpretation of GATT rules as applied to indirect taxes like 
border adjustments.99 
To contribute to the existing muddiness and doubt surrounding 
GATT-legality of border adjustments on carbon taxes, WTO law does 
not recognize the doctrine of stare decisis.100 Accordingly, the WTO’s 
dispute settlement bodies (DSBs) are not bound by precedent, further 
complicating this analysis.101 In the absence of the stare decisis 
doctrine, it is difficult—if not impossible—to predict with any 
certainty how the WTO may rule on any given issue. 
 
95 Charles E. McClure, Jr., The GATT-Legality of Border Adjustments for Carbon 
Taxes and the Cost of Emissions Permits: A Riddle, Wrapped in a Mystery, Inside an 
Enigma, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 221, 236 (2011). “Indirect taxes are levied on the production 
or consumption of goods and services or on transactions, including imports and exports. 
Examples include general and selective sales taxes, value-added taxes (VAT), taxes on any 
aspect of manufacturing or production, taxes on legal transactions, and customs or import 
duties.” Indirect Taxes, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com 
/EBchecked/topic/584578/taxation/72005/Indirect-taxes (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). 
96 See McClure, supra note 95, at 236. 
97 Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC 
Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 61 
(1994). 
98 Id. at 61–62. 
99 McClure, supra note 95, at 236. 
100 “As in other areas of international law, there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO 
dispute settlement.” Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB 
Recommendations and Rulings, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
This means that a panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body reports 
even if they have developed a certain interpretation of exactly the provisions 
which are now at issue before the panel. Nor is the Appellate Body obliged to 
maintain the legal interpretations it has developed in past cases. 
Id. 
101 Id. 
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Despite its inability to bind its DSBs to precedent, some solace 
may be found in the fact that 
[i]f the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of the 
interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the 
perspective of the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent 
case, it is very likely that the panel or the Appellate Body will 
repeat and follow it.102 
While this does not openly insinuate the principle of precedent, the 
qualification of “very likely” does suggest that previous reports are 
good indicators of the likely outcomes of similar disputes. 
This is also in line with a key objective of the dispute settlement 
system which is to enhance the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system. . . . In the words of the Appellate Body, 
these GATT and WTO panel reports—and equally adopted 
Appellate Body reports—“create legitimate expectations among 
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where 
they are relevant to any dispute.”103 
Due to the enormity of uncertainty surrounding GATT-legality of 
border adjustments, it is imperative to thoroughly explore the relevant 
provisions of the WTO and GATT to predict how the WTO may 
adjudicate the matter. 
B. The Potential Application of GATT Provisions to Border 
Adjustments 
Generally, WTO and GATT rules aim to ensure non-discriminatory 
measures and prevent disguised protectionism efforts by nations.104 
When a nation’s proposed measures violate the relevant provisions set 
forth by WTO and GATT, the nation may seek to argue for the 
measure’s legality under GATT Article XX, which provides for 
general exceptions.105 Article XX of GATT allows for preferential 
measures that may violate other GATT provisions under very narrow 
exceptions, and only when the treatment is not arbitrary or 
discriminatory.106 Therefore, determining the legality of border 
adjustments for carbon taxes requires a two-tier analysis. First, 
whether the border adjustments can satisfy the relevant controlling 




104 Herman, supra note 32, at 200. 
105 GATT, supra note 33, at art. III(2). 
106 Id. at art. XX. 
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then whether carbon tax border adjustments may qualify for an Article 
XX exception. 
1. Border Adjustments Under GATT Articles I and III 
Because border adjustments may impede international trade in their 
efforts to neutralize the loss of competitiveness suffered by domestic 
industries of carbon taxing nations, GATT Articles I and III likely 
pose the greatest obstacles to the legality of such equalizing 
provisions.107 
GATT Article III contains the “national treatment” clause, which 
states in relevant part: “[t]he products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or 
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products.”108 The national treatment 
requirement, therefore, mandates that nations treat imported products 
no less favorably than “like” domestic products. 
Herein lies an important WTO distinction regarding the legality of 
border adjustments on carbon taxes: product taxes versus process 
taxes. Product taxes, or taxes on a final product, are generally 
accepted as legal under GATT.109 For example, a country may 
permissibly impose a domestic tax or border adjustment on imported 
gasoline because the gasoline constitutes a final product. Nations may 
impose restrictions on such imports as long as such restrictions are 
comparable to those imposed on domestic goods with respect to their 
physical characteristics and performance.110 In contrast, process 
taxes, or taxes on production inputs including land, labor, and raw 
materials, are highly controversial and their legality is less certain.111 
Nations likely would violate the national treatment clause if they 
sought to impose restrictions on how a product was made if those 
production methods did not affect the product’s performance or 
characteristics.112 
 
107 DEAL, supra note 4, at 5. 
108 GATT, supra note 33, at art. III(2). 
109 DAVID W. PEARCE, BLUEPRINT 4: CAPTURING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
95 (1995). 
110 DEAL, supra note 4, at 5. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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WTO law further distinguishes taxing inputs that remain physical 
components of the final product and inputs that are not incorporated 
into the final product from taxing products based on their PPM.113 
Generally, GATT rules permit border adjustments on inputs that 
remain physical components of the final product. However, no WTO 
dispute panel has yet ruled on the legality of taxing inputs that are not 
incorporated into the final product. As a result, nations bidding to 
implement border adjustments for carbon taxes (which are based on 
the energy consumed in the production of a product) must resort to 
searching WTO case law and investigating legislative history for 
further guidance. Even then, it cannot be said with certainty how the 
WTO would rule on the matter. 
In the Superfund case,114 the WTO dispute panel upheld a U.S. tax 
on imported chemicals based on the amount of feedstock chemicals 
created during production, a process-based border adjustment.115 It 
upheld the border adjustment on the basis that it “corresponded to an 
internal United States tax on the same chemicals from which the 
imported substances were derived.”116 While this holding would 
seemingly support GATT-legality of border adjustments for carbon 
taxes, its transferability and persuasiveness is complicated by what 
the dispute panel failed to consider.117 The panel failed to consider 
whether the domestically taxed U.S. feedstock and imported 
chemicals were “like” products, nor did it consider whether the 
foreign feedstock chemicals were physically incorporated in the 
imported chemicals.118 Moreover, it did not determine whether such 
an inquiry was even relevant.119 
Furthermore, the WTO dispute panels of Tuna/Dolphin I and 
Tuna/Dolphin II held that an import ban on tuna could not be based 
on the manner in which the tuna were caught if the final product was 
not affected.120 The cases stood for the proposition that countries 
 
113 Rich, supra note 74, at 7. 
114 See generally Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain 
Imported Substances, BISD 34S/136 (June 17, 1987) [hereinafter Superfund], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/87superf.pdf. 
115 Id. 
116 Herman, supra note 32, at 204. 
117 Id. 
118 See Superfund, supra note 114. 
119 McClure, supra note 95, at 254. 
120 See generally Panel Reports, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, BISD 
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I] and United States—Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II]. 
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cannot discriminate against products based on the way they are 
produced unless such production processes affect the physical 
characteristics of the final product.121 Under the Tuna/Dolphin 
regime, the physical characteristics of a product were the only 
relevant considerations for determining whether two products were 
“like” for GATT purposes.122 Per the Tuna/Dolphin cases, border 
adjustments for carbon taxes would likely not be legal under GATT; 
however, because the cases were never adopted by the WTO, they 
have no legal weight and do little more than raise the fear that border 
adjustments “could not be justified by arguing that differences in 
PPMs made products ‘unlike.’”123 
Case law aside, the legislative intent behind GATT is best 
examined by investigating the recorded discussions of the Havana 
Charter for an International Trade Organization.124 The Charter 
served as the basis for GATT and suggested that all taxes on inputs to 
a product were intended to be adjustable, regardless of whether the 
taxed entity was physically incorporated raw materials, non-
incorporated inputs, or outputs themselves.125 
Even assuming that carbon tax border adjustments could pass 
muster under GATT Article III, commentators have labeled GATT 
Article I as the “elephant in the room” that may categorically 
invalidate the border adjustment measures.126 Article I contains the 
General Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, requiring equal 
treatment and complete nondiscrimination among WTO 
signatories.127 In relevant part, Article I states: “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties.”128 In accordance with MFN treatment, “all imports of the 
same products must be given fully equivalent treatment vis-à-vis one 




123 McClure, supra note 95, at 267. 
124 Id. at 252. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 265. 
127 GATT, supra note 33, at art. I. 
128 Id. at art. I(1). 
129 Herman, supra note 32, at 200. 
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apply border adjustments on imports from countries with different—
or no—greenhouse gas emission control policies must overcome the 
burden of proving that such measures do not violate the MFN clause 
of Article I. Due to the lack of international uniformity regarding 
carbon tax regimes, nations proposing to implement border 
adjustments for their domestic carbon taxes comprise a mixed 
system.130 Because border adjustments would be imposed on trade 
with nations that lack policies for mitigating carbon emissions, 
nations would be favoring trade with some countries and penalizing 
products from countries with weak or non-existent climate policies.131 
This mixed system would result in the application of border 
adjustments to trade with some nations but not others, and the WTO 
would very likely find that such a mixed system categorically violates 
MFN treatment and therefore GATT Article I.132 However, the 
possibility that a carbon tax regime can comport with obligations 
under both the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO was salvaged by the 
WTO Appellate Body’s intervention in Shrimp/Turtle. 
The Shrimp/Turtle case represents “a fundamental shift in WTO 
jurisprudence”133 and arguably enables nations to discriminate based 
on PPMs to achieve environmental goals.134 Despite complaints from 
several Asian countries that the United States could not apply its laws 
to foreign PPMs, the Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle upheld a U.S. 
law that restricted imports of shrimp caught in nets that were not 
equipped with turtle excluder devices.135 The Appellate Body 
ultimately ruled against the United States because of the manner in 
which the law was implemented, but it found that the law was 
permissible under the Article XX exception for efforts relating to the 
conservation and protection of an “exhaustible natural resource[].”136 
In doing so, “the Appellate Body completed a transition in dispute 
settlement reasoning that, if sustained, would permit members to 
invoke the Article XX exemptions to regulate imports on the basis of 
non-product related PPMs to accomplish environmental objectives 
 
130 McClure, supra note 95, at 265. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 266. 
133 DEAL, supra note 4, at 8. 
134 Rich, supra note 74, at 9. 
135 See generally Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf. 
136 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(g). 
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both outside their jurisdiction and in the global commons.”137 The 
Shrimp/Turtle case stands for the proposition that non-product related 
PPMs may be acceptable restraints on international trade where the 
implementing nation’s purpose is to protect a resource that is found in 
the global commons.138 
Despite the potential support that this case provides for the legality 
of border adjustments for carbon taxes, it is important to note that, as 
with Superfund, it may be difficult to argue that Shrimp/Turtle strictly 
supports the assertion that domestic laws may be applied to restrict 
imports on the basis of carbon-emitting PPMs used to make the 
imported product. The most dissonant fact to distinguish 
Shrimp/Turtle from carbon tax border adjustments is that the former 
involved the protection of an endangered animal species, not the 
taxation and related adjustments of environmentally harmful 
greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, Shrimp/Turtle is commonly 
interpreted as the case that opened the door for nations to use border 
adjustments to counteract their domestic carbon tax regimes under 
GATT Article XX exceptions, even when the measures would have 
violated GATT Articles I and III.139 
2. Border Adjustments and GATT Article XX General Exceptions 
Even if border adjustments conflict with international trade law, 
they might still be legal if justifiable under GATT Article XX,140 
which specifies the conditions under which Members can be 
exempted from WTO general rules. Two of these enumerated 
exemptions could be relevant in the case of border adjustments: if 
doing so is “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health,”141 or if it “relat[es] to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.”142 WTO panel rulings have held that “governments bear 
the burden of justifying any measure taken under these [Article XX] 
exceptions and affirmatively demonstrating that the measure is both 
 
137 PETER MORICI, ECON. STRATEGY INST., RECONCILING TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2002). 
138 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 11. 
139 See Charnovitz, supra note 85. 
140 See GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX. 
141 Id. at art. XX(b). 
142 Id. at art. XX(g); see also Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Obama Criticizes 
Border Tax Adjustments in House Climate Bill, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. at 
4 (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Criticizes BTAs], available at http://ictsd.org/down 
loads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly13-24.pdf. 
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‘necessary’ and directly connected with the need to protect human life 
or health or truly is a legitimate conservation measure.”143 In 
addition, we must keep in mind that the introductory paragraph 
(“chapeau”) of Article XX allows for such measures as long as they 
“are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”144 Such an exemption would most likely “center on whether, 
under the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX, a [border 
adjustment] . . . is applied on a variable scale that takes account of 
local conditions in foreign countries, including their own efforts to 
fight global warming and the level of economic development in 
developing countries.”145 Therefore, a government “would also have 
to show that the measure is being applied squarely to avoid ‘leakage,’ 
rather than to offset competitive concerns.”146 
Given the “strict requirements of GATT and the tendency of panels 
to disapprove of national measures that smack of discrimination, the 
debate over environmentally related border measures comes down to 
the availability of these GATT exceptions.”147 Consequently, nations 
and their policymakers alike must consider whether border 
adjustments for carbon taxes could survive a GATT Article XX 
analysis. According to the WTO Appellate Body, a two-step analysis 
must be followed in applying Article XX.148 First, the proposed 
measure must satisfy one of the specified exceptions of Article XX. 
Second, the proposed measure must satisfy the chapeau of Article 
XX. This second layer of analysis serves as a “formidable 
gatekeeper,”149 as in all cases where the Appellate Body denied an 
Article XX exception because the chapeau was not met.150 
 
143 Herman, supra note 32, at 211. 
144 See GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX. 
145 Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The 
Limits and Options of International Trade Law 3 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy 
Solutions, Duke Univ., Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://nicholas 
institute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competi 
tiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law-paper.pdf. 
146 Obama Criticizes BTAs, supra note 142, at 4. 
147 Herman, supra note 32, at 208. 
148 McClure, supra note 95, at 269. 
149 Arjun Ponnambalam, U.S. Climate Change Legislation and the Use of GATT Article 
XX to Justify a “Competitiveness Provision” in the Wake of Brazil-Tyres, 40 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 261, 274 (2008). 
150 Pauwelyn, supra note 145, at 37. 
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a. Exceptions to GATT Article XX 
GATT Article XX lists two relevant exceptions under which 
nations may argue for the legality of the border adjustments for their 
carbon tax regimes. Paragraph (b) creates an exception for measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.”151 
Additionally, the Appellate Body152 elucidates the definition of 
“necessary” as not the least-restrictive approach as the natural 
definition suggests, but instead requires merely a less restrictive 
approach supplemented with a necessity test.153 To determine whether 
the measure truly is necessary, the Appellate Body conducts the test 
on a case-by-case basis, weighing the following factors: (1) the 
contribution made by the measure to the enforcement of the 
regulation at issue, (2) the importance of the common interests or 
values protected by the regulation, and (3) the accompanying impact 
of the measures on imports or exports.154 
The environmental measure proposed in EC-Asbestos155 was the 
first to satisfy the Appellate Body’s necessity analysis.156 The WTO 
explained that the more “vital or important common interests or 
values” pursued by the measure, the more likely it would be to deem 
the proposed measure necessary.157 Due to the sparse guidance from 
WTO DSBs regarding the exception concerning measures “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,”158 such an analysis 
would be very difficult and highly speculative—the result is to leave 
an analysis of this exception “unsettled” for now.159 However, the 
exception concerning measures “necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health”160 contains sufficient precedent and WTO 
 
151 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(b). 
152 “The Appellate Body is composed of seven [WTO] Members who are appointed by 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to serve for four-year terms. Each person may be 
reappointed for another four-year term. Terms are staggered, ensuring that not all 
Members begin and complete their terms at the same time.” Appellate Body Members, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp 
_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
153 McClure, supra note 95, at 269. 
154 Id. 
155 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001). 
156 See id. 
157 WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT AT THE WTO 21, 52 (2004). 
158 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(g). 
159 Herman, supra note 32, at 212. 
160 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(b). 
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administrative analysis to be scrutinized in relation to its suitability as 
justification for permitting border adjustments under GATT Article 
XX. 
Nations seeking to prove the legality of border adjustments for 
their carbon tax regimes will likely pursue an argument under the 
exception from paragraph (g) for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”161 Per Shrimp/Turtle, restrictive 
conditions based on PPMs intended to protect the environment, such 
as border adjustments, may be considered legal under the Article XX, 
paragraph (g) exception.162 The Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body 
applied a three-prong test to determine whether the exception was 
satisfied.163 For the purposes of determining whether border 
adjustments satisfy paragraph (g), the following must be considered: 
(1) whether the resource in question, here the atmosphere, is an 
exhaustible natural resource; (2) whether a substantial relationship 
exists between border adjustments and the conservation of the 
exhaustible natural resource; and (3) whether border adjustments are 
even-handed, or made effective “in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.”164 
Recall that despite the WTO’s inability to bind its DSBs to 
precedent, 
[i]f the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of the 
interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the 
perspective of the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent 
case, it is very likely that the panel or the Appellate Body will 
repeat and follow it.165 
This principle allows for a reasonable determination of how DSBs 
will rule in subsequent cases with regard to the abovementioned 
three-prong test. 
The Appellate Body’s decision in Reformulated Gasoline provides 
a durable answer to the first inquiry by explaining that air, and 
therefore the atmosphere, is an exhaustible natural resource.166 
 
161 Id. at art. XX(g). 
162 Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 135. 
163 Id. 
164 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(g). 
165 Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, supra note 100. 
166  Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996). 
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Because the paragraph (g) exception should be considered “in light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the 
protection and conservation of the environment,”167 the ratification of 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol by the majority of nations would also seem to support 
an affirmative answer to this element. The “substantial relationship” 
required by the second element necessitates that a reasonable “means 
and ends” relationship exist between conserving the exhaustible 
natural resource and the proposed measure; incidental relationships 
will not suffice.168 Some critics believe that border adjustments for 
carbon taxes will fail this element because they primarily aim not to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but to remedy loss of 
competitiveness by domestic industries subject to carbon taxes.169 
However, an increasing number of scholars and academics contend 
that border adjustments on carbon taxes would satisfy this element 
because they constitute an integral part of the carbon tax regime 
aimed at reducing emissions.170 
As an integral part of a regime focused on conserving an 
exhaustible natural resource, carbon tax border adjustments likely 
meet this second GATT requirement. However, even in the absence of 
such a finding before a subsequent Appellate Body, there remains a 
chance that the regime will not be found to violate international trade 
law. Assuming the carbon tax border adjustments are not applied 
arbitrarily or in violation of other GATT rules, the WTO may still 
decide to overlook the absence of a direct relationship and accept the 
lesser relationship between the carbon taxes and border adjustments if 
there is sufficient and convincing support from the international 
community in favor of the measures. Although only speculative at this 
time, as international sentiments and the effects of climate change 
continue to wax toward ever new zeniths, the likelihood of such an 
eleventh-hour acceptance becomes more and more probable. 
The third element presents another difficult analysis and further 
obfuscates a prediction of how the WTO may rule. Element three of 
the Shrimp/Turtle inquiry requires the evenhandedness of the 
 
167 See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 135. 
168 Id. ¶ 135–42. 
169 Rich, supra note 74, at 8. 
170 See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 145, at 35; Harro van Asselt et al., Addressing 
Leakage and Competitiveness in U.S. Climate Policy: Issues Concerning Border 
Adjustment Measures 53 (Climate Strategies, Working Paper, 2009). 
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proposed measure to be “made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”171 Border 
adjustments on carbon taxes for imported goods likely would satisfy 
this requirement because they are indeed imposed and made effective 
in conjunction with a domestic carbon tax.172 The complications arise 
regarding border adjustments for carbon taxes on exported goods.173 
Literally interpreted, export border adjustments would satisfy this 
third element because they are implemented in conjunction with a 
domestic carbon tax that similarly restricts production or 
consumption. It may be argued that the principal purpose of export 
border adjustments is to prevent competitive disadvantage rather than 
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource; however, evidence that 
the carbon taxes imposed on domestic production of carbon-intensive 
goods matched the levies on similar imported goods would vitiate this 
point of opposition.174 Therefore, any tax regime must comport with 
the requirement to tax both imports and exports at a similar rate in 
order to reject suggestions that such a regime is simply a façade for 
implementing protectionist policies. 
b. The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau 
The chapeau, or introductory paragraph of GATT Article XX 
general exceptions, lays out the general context within which the 
exceptions should be read and interpreted. Proposed measures 
“applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade” 
would violate the chapeau and, therefore, not qualify for the Article 
XX exception.175 
A chapeau discussion calls for a two-pronged analysis because the 
chapeau itself is separated into two distinct clauses: (1) arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, and (2) disguised restriction on international 
trade.176 Each clause constitutes a different requirement that proposed 
 
171 Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 135, ¶ 143–45. 
172 McClure, supra note 95, at 272–73. 
173 Id. 
174 RAPHAEL COTTIN ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO AND ENVIRONMENT: 
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 13, available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/mia 
/users/Imene_Ajala/public/WTO%20Seminar%202009/cottin_meier_bordertax.pdf. 
175 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX. 
176 Id. 
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measures must satisfy in order to pass muster under the chapeau.177 
Carbon tax border adjustments on international trade between 
countries with similarly effective carbon tax regimes arguably would 
fail to satisfy the first clause. For example, the United States likely 
could not legally impose border adjustments on trade with European 
Union countries that already had their Emissions Trading Schemes 
(ETS) in place because of the similarity of the conditions in both 
countries.178 Although the measures are different, the effects of a 
carbon tax are comparable to those of an emissions trading system. 
Conversely, a nation within the European Union could impose carbon 
tax border adjustments on trade with another E.U. nation that had not 
adopted such measures because the “same conditions” would not 
exist. 
The Appellate Body’s decision in Brazil-Tyres179 sheds 
considerable light on the chapeau’s second requirement, which 
prohibits measures constituting disguised protectionism. It supports 
the assertion that carbon tax border adjustments imposed on a neutral 
standard180 and criteria unrelated to a specific country may satisfy the 
chapeau’s second requirement.181 In Brazil-Tyres and Shrimp/Turtle, 
the Appellate Body suggested that a DSB would seek to balance the 
competing interests when interpreting a treaty exception rather than 
following the traditional, narrow approach. Consequently, “this 
perspective is much more likely to produce a favorable ruling 
regarding a destination-based carbon-tax border adjustment than a 
more traditional legalistic narrow view of the exceptions clause.”182 
For this reason, the WTO will look upon carbon tax border 
adjustments favorably because of the Appellate Body’s willingness to 
conduct a balancing inquiry. Consequently, the international interest 
of mitigating climate change and global warming by reducing 




178 Pauwelyn, supra note 145, at 38–39. 
179 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999). 
180 An amount of emissions created during production processes. Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Keith A. Kendall, Carbon Taxes and the WTO—A Carbon Charge without Trade 
Concerns? (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/keith 
_kendall/4/. 
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CONCLUSION 
The world trade regime is not inherently at odds with climate 
change mitigation; nor is the climate change regime inherently at odds 
with trade liberalization. The WTO acknowledges the need for 
multilateral efforts to protect the environment, and the Kyoto Protocol 
explicitly admonishes against implementing policies that adversely 
affect international trade.183 Nevertheless, conflict between the two 
regimes is likely to arise when certain policies, implemented to 
reduce carbon emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, 
inadvertently affect international trade. As illustrated above, such is 
the case with the implementation of a carbon tax regime. While the 
lack of certainty is daunting to any rational actor, the consequences of 
not acting may be even greater.184 
The current trade regime provides for an imperfect market that 
lacks accountability for the direct and indirect costs that negative 
externalities, such as carbon emissions, inflict upon the planet. 
However, the application of a carbon tax regime as described in this 
article provides an incentive structure that requires countries to 
account for those costs and reduces emissions where feasible. 
Additionally, such a regime seems to be perhaps the only current 
possible structure that provides an answer for the carbon leakage and 
collective action problems that otherwise plague international climate 
change mitigation policy.185 Therefore, despite the uncertainty in 
WTO jurisprudence, the world should not be reticent to embrace such 
taxation regimes for fear of asymmetry with WTO guidelines. The 
time for action is now, and the unilateral power inherent in such a 





183 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 2, sec. 3. 
184 See Plumer, supra note 17. 
185 See Elliott et al., supra note 90, at 469; Christa Clapp et al., Levelling the Playing 
Field in a Fragmented Carbon Market: Do Carbon-Based Border Tax Adjustments 
Work?, CLIMATE SCI. & POL’Y (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu 
/2010/09/levelling-the-playing-field-in-a-fragmented-carbon-market-do-carbon-based        
-border-tax-adjustments-work/. 
